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The SOE reform in China/周大勇

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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

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赣州市人民政府关于印发赣州市政府投资建设项目代建制管理办法(试行)的通知

江西省赣州市人民政府办公厅


赣州市人民政府关于印发赣州市政府投资建设项目代建制管理办法(试行)的通知

赣市府发[2007]27号


各县(市、区)人民政府,赣州经济技术开发区管委会,市政府各部门,市属各单位:

现将《赣州市政府投资建设项目代建制管理办法(试行)》印发给你们,请认真贯彻执行。




二OO七年八月十五日




赣州市政府投资建设项目代建制管理办法(试行)


第一章 总 则

第一条 为进一步深化投资体制改革,提高政府投资建设项目管理水平,发挥政府投资效益,根据《中华人民共和国招标投标法》和《国务院关于投资体制改革的决定》,制定本办法。

第二条 本办法所称代建制,是指对非经营性政府投资建设项目,通过招标等方式,选择专业化的项目管理单位(以下简称代建单位),以合同形式委托其行使项目建设单位职能,负责项目组织实施,严格控制项目投资、质量、安全和工期,建成后交付使用单位的制度。

第三条 在本市行政区域内,基础设施类项目概算总投资1000万元及以上的、其他类型项目概算总投资500万元及以上的,且市级政府投资占项目概算总投资50%以上的非经营性项目,实行代建制管理,执行本办法。关系全局、影响长远的重大项目实施代建制,须经市政府常务会议研究决定。

第四条 市政府授权市发改委负责本市政府投资建设项目代建制的审批、管理和实施,会同有关行政主管部门拟定有关代建制的配套文件,报市政府批准后实施。

市财政局负责对代建制项目的财务活动实施财政财务管理和监督。

市规划建设、土地、交通、水利、城管、房地产、文物、环保、消防、人防、地震等行政主管部门按照各自职责分工对代建项目进行管理和监督。

市审计、监察部门按照各自职责分工对代建项目进行监督。

第五条 政府投资项目代建制管理的具体方式分以下二种:

(一)全过程代建方式,即由代建单位从项目建议书批复后开始,经可行性研究、设计、施工、竣工验收,直至竣工验收合格并已交付使用时结束,实行全过程管理。

(二)建设实施阶段代建方式,即由代建单位从初步设计(或施工图设计)批复后开始,经施工图设计、施工、竣工验收,直至竣工验收合格并已交付使用时结束,实行建设实施阶段管理。

采用建设实施阶段代建方式的,初步设计批复前的各项工作可由使用单位自行组织开展,也可由使用单位委托具有相应工程咨询资质的代理机构协助其组织开展。

第六条 代建单位由市发改委按照国家和省有关规定通过招标等方式确定。

代建单位的招标过程接受相关职能部门的监督和检查。市发改委根据本办法拟定《赣州市政府投资建设项目代建单位招标投标程序规定》,报市政府批准后施行。

有以下特殊情形之一的,市重点项目经市政府批准,其他项目经市发改委批准,代建单位可通过直接委托方式确定:

(一)抢险救灾或者有特殊技术要求、特殊工期要求的;

(二)停建或者缓建后恢复建设,且代建单位仍具备代建能力的;

(三)经原审批部门审批,追建附属、配套设施,且代建单位仍具备代建能力的;

(四)有效投标人不足3人,经重新招标后仍不足3人的;

(五)法律、法规规定不适宜招标的其他情形。

第七条 代建项目实行合同管理,项目投资管理单位或使用单位与代建单位签订《委托代建合同》,并报项目主管部门备案。代建单位依据《委托代建合同》行使项目建设单位职能,负责项目组织实施,并承担依法应由建设单位承担的法律责任和经济责任。

市发改委根据本办法拟定《赣州市政府投资建设项目委托代建合同(示范文本)》,报市政府批准后实施。

代建单位以使用单位名义申办各项行政审批或者许可手续,以自身名义开展各项招标工作,商签有关经济合同。

第八条 代建项目实行履约保证担保制度。在《委托代建合同》签订前,代建单位一般应向项目投资管理单位提交代建履约保函。

第九条 代建单位应履行国家及省市关于政府投资建设项目的各项管理程序,应遵守国家及省市关于政府投资建设项目的各项法律、法规。

市有关行政主管部门应依据《委托代建合同》将各项行政审批或者许可手续办理给使用单位,并在批复文件或许可证书中注明代建单位名称。

第十条 代建单位应具备以下条件:

(一)具有独立的法人资格;

(二)具有相应的资质;

(三)具有完善的管理制度、同类或者相近项目的管理业绩、满足项目管理需要的自有管理、技术及财务专业人员;

(四)具有与所要求承担的经济责任相适应的经济实力。

第十一条 代建单位有下列情形之一的,不得参与代建项目招标:

(一)已被行政或司法机关责令停业或停止承接工程任务的;

(二)企业出现严重的信用和信誉危机又未能提供相应担保的;

(三)近三年发生过重大建设项目责任事故的;

(四)有违法、违规及不良记录的;

(五)无法履行代建职责的其他情形。


第二章 代建项目各方工作内容

第十二条 项目投资管理单位是安排政府投资并委托代建任务的主体,主要承担如下工作:

(一)通过招标等方式选择确定代建单位;

(二)按合同约定安排政府投资计划或者专项建设资金;

(三)协调代建单位、使用单位及与代建项目有关的各政府行政主管部门之间的关系,监督和指导代建项目的实施;

(四)组织代建单位将经竣工验收合格的代建项目向使用单位移交。

第十三条 代建单位是按照合同约定负责代建项目组织实施的主体,主要承担如下工作:

(一)负责项目勘察、设计等招标活动,商签并管理相关合同;

(二)组织开展项目可行性研究、地质勘察、市政配套条件落实、方案设计和初步设计等工作;

(三)申办规划选址意见书、建设用地预审、环境影响评价、交通影响评价、可行性研究报告、设计方案审查、施工图审查、土地使用批准、建设用地规划许可、建设工程规划许可、建筑工程施工许可、征地许可、消防、人防、园林绿化、市政和初步设计等行政审批或许可手续;

(四)组织开展项目施工图设计文件编制及报审,负责项目施工、监理、设备及材料采购等招标活动,商签并管理相关合同;

(五)编制项目的年度投资计划和年度基建支出预算报财政部门批准。申领项目建设资金,并对建设资金的使用进行管理;

(六)全面负责项目实施阶段(含缺陷责任期)建设管理,组织工程的中间验收、专项验收和竣工验收,编制工程竣工决算报告,按批准的资产价值向使用单位办理资产移交手续,协助使用单位办理产权登记手续。

采用建设实施阶段代建方式的,代建单位不承担本条第(一)、(二)、(三)款工作。

第十四条 项目使用单位是提出使用需求并在项目竣工验收合格后实际接收、使用或者管理的主体,主要承担如下工作:

(一)提出项目建设内容、建设规模、建设标准和功能配置等使用需求;

(二)协助代建单位申办规划选址意见书、建设用地预审、环境影响评价、交通影响评价、可行性研究报告、设计方案审查、施工图审查、土地使用批准、建设用地规划许可、建设工程规划许可、建筑工程施工许可、征地许可、消防、人防、园林绿化、市政和初步设计等行政审批或许可手续;

(三)监督项目勘察和设计等招标过程,以及代建单位对项目勘察、方案设计和初步设计的质量、进度及资金使用的管理工作;

(四)监督项目施工、监理、材料和设备采购等招标过程,以及代建单位对工程的质量、进度和资金使用的管理工作;

(五)筹措政府差额拨款投资项目中的自筹资金,并按合同约定及时将自筹资金拨付到代建单位指定的资金账户中;

(六)参与工程竣工验收,按有关规定办理资产接收手续和产权登记手续。

采用建设实施阶段代建方式的,使用单位还应承担第十三条第(一)、(二)、(三)款工作。


第三章 项目组织和实施

  第十五条 使用单位提出项目使用需求,组织编制项目建议书,报市发改委审批。

  第十六条 市发改委批复项目建议书,并在项目建议书批复中明确是否实行代建制、代建管理方式以及代建单位的选择方式。

第十七条 代建单位或使用单位根据批复的项目建议书组织编制可行性研究报告,报市发改委审批。

第十八条 代建单位或使用单位根据批准的可行性研究报告组织编制初步设计。初步设计概算投资超过经批准的可行性研究报告估算总投资的10%的,需修改初步设计或编制可行性研究报告,并按规定程序报市发改委审批。

第十九条 可行性研究报告和初步设计审批前,市发改委须进行评审。代建单位应以批准的初步设计概算作为投资控制最高限额。

第二十条 采用全过程代建方式的,应在项目建议书批复后,根据本办法第六条规定确定代建单位。

采用建设实施阶段代建方式的,应在初步设计批复后,根据本办法第六条规定确定代建单位。

第二十一条 代建单位在《委托代建合同》签订前,应按如下控制标准提交由银行出具的履约保函。履约保函的具体担保金额在代建单位招标文件中确定。

(一)项目总投资1000万元及以上、5000万元以下的项目,担保金额为总投资的10—15%,且不低于200万元;

(二)项目总投资5000万元及以上、1亿元以下的项目,担保金额为总投资的7—10%,且不低于500万元;

(三)项目总投资1亿元及以上的项目,担保金额为总投资的5—7%,且不低于700万元。

代建单位应以其自有资产办理履约保函,不得以债务性资产办理履约保函,也不得接受与其存在利益关系的单位以其办理履约保函而提供的任何便利条件。

第二十二条 代建单位应严格按照投标书承诺和《委托代建合同》约定,派出项目经理,组建管理机构,完善管理制度,配备管理人员。

项目经理不得同时在两个以上(含两个)代建项目中从事代建管理工作。

第二十三条 代建单位应按照经批准的初步设计,进行项目组织管理,严格控制项目投资,确保工程安全和质量,按期交付使用。严禁在施工过程中利用施工洽商或者补签其他协议等方式,擅自变更建设内容、建设规模和建设标准。

第二十四条 经批复的初步设计概算投资一般不得变动。在项目实施过程中,因以下情况导致投资增加的,由代建单位或使用单位提出,经项目投资管理单位同意后,可从项目预备费中列支;预备费不足、需要增加项目概算投资的,应报市发改委批准后调整。

(一)遭遇不可抗力;

(二)国家及省市政策(包括价格)调整;

(三)技术、水文、地质等原因导致设计变更。

第二十五条 具有相应专业(或者行业)的工程咨询、招标代理、工程勘察、工程设计和工程总承包资质的代建单位,经在投标文件中提出,并在合同中约定,可以直接从事所代建项目范围内的相关工作。但代建单位不得具有下列行为:

(一)在代建项目中同时承担工程监理、施工业务;

(二)在代建项目中同时承担设备、材料供应业务;

(三)将代建项目的监理以及设备、材料供应委托给与其有隶属关系或者其他利益关系的单位;

(四)将其承接的业务全部或者部分转让他人。

第二十六条 代建单位应按照《委托代建合同》约定时间向项目投资管理单位、市财政局和使用单位分别报送《项目代建管理月报》。

第二十七条 代建项目建成后,代建单位应按照工程竣工验收备案管理的有关规定,进行竣工验收并办理竣工验收备案手续;按照《委托代建合同》约定,在规定期限内编制完成竣工决算,申办竣工决算审批手续;按市财政局批准的资产价值向使用单位办理资产移交手续,并协助使用单位和产权管理部门办理产权登记手续。

第二十八条 代建单位应按照《中华人民共和国档案法》及相关法规,建立健全有关档案。在向使用单位办理资产移交手续时,一并将工程档案、财务档案及相关资料向使用单位、有关部门移交。

第二十九条 市发改委会同市财政局、市审计局和市监察局等部门共同选聘社会中介机构,委托其对代建单位履行代建合同情况进行巡回式监督检查,并将监督检查结果及时报告上述各部门。

代建单位应接受市有关行政主管部门及其委托的中介机构,依据国家和省市有关规定对代建项目所进行的检查、稽察、审计和监察。


第四章 建设资金管理

第三十条 代建项目建设资金由市财政和其他投资方分别筹集,并按资金来源渠道分别拨付。其中:财政性资金实行国库集中支付,由参与代建的各资金申请单位,根据批准的年度投资计划、项目实施计划、项目施工进度和项目实施合同书,填写拨款申请表并附有效凭据,按规定程序报市财政局审核拨款。

第三十一条 采用建设实施阶段代建方式的,对使用单位开展项目前期工作需发生的前期费用,由使用单位填写拨款申请,提供合同、招标文件、费用票据等有效凭据,报市财政局审核拨付。

第三十二条 代建项目各方应严格执行基本建设财务管理制度,保证资金安全使用,并接受财政、审计等部门监督检查。


第五章 代建管理取费

第三十三条 项目代建管理费是代建单位全面履行《委托代建合同》所应获取的报酬,不包括代建单位自行承担代建项目可行性研究报告编制、招标代理等工作的费用。代建项目管理费计入项目总投资,原建设单位管理费不再重复计取。

第三十四条 项目代建管理费用的提取,可参照但不得高于国家和省有关部门规定建设单位管理费标准执行,采用建设实施阶段代建方式的,代建管理费应不高于标准的70%,前期代理机构协助使用单位或由使用单位直接组织开展前期工作所计取的前期工作管理费应不高于标准的30%,并在项目代建合同中予以约定。


第六章 奖励、赔偿及相关责任

第三十五条 采用全过程代建方式或建设实施阶段代建方式的,项目竣工验收合格,并经竣工财务决算审批后,决算投资额比合同约定投资控制额有节余,项目投资管理单位可从政府投资节余资金(按出资比例计算)中提取10-30%,作为对代建单位的奖励,其余部分上缴市财政。使用单位自筹资金节余部分(按出资比例计算)的奖励比例,在《委托代建合同》中约定。

第三十六条 代建单位在代建管理过程中擅自变更建设内容、建设规模和建设标准,或者违反本办法其他规定,项目投资管理单位可视情况进行劝诫、暂停资金安排、暂停合同执行,直至解除合同,所造成的损失由代建单位承担。

因代建单位原因,决算投资额超过合同约定投资控制额、工期延长、工程质量不合格或者不具备初步设计文件确定的使用功能,所增加的投资额或者造成的损失由代建单位承担,工期延长处以罚款并在合同中约定。项目投资管理单位从代建单位提交的履约保函中追偿所增加的投资额或者造成的损失,履约保函金额不足的,从代建管理费中追偿。

被追究赔偿责任和被拒绝回购项目的代建单位,三年内不得参与本市政府投资建设项目代建管理工作。

第三十七条 在委托代建合同有效期间发生的违法违规行为,依据有关法律法规属于应由建设单位承担的法律责任,由代建单位承担。

被追究法律责任的代建单位,五年内不得参与本市政府投资建设项目代建管理工作。

第三十八条 项目投资管理单位、使用单位,及其他行政主管部门不按照本办法规定承担相关工作、履行相关职责的,承担相应责任,并由市监察部门责令改正。

项目投资管理单位、使用单位,及其他行政主管部门的工作人员徇私舞弊、滥用职权或者索贿受贿,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任;不构成犯罪的,依法追究行政责任。


第七章 附则

第三十九条 项目投资管理单位根据项目具体情况,可与使用单位的上级主管部门共同负责招标确定代建单位,签订《委托代建合同》,监督代建项目实施;也可委托使用单位的上级主管部门单独负责招标代建单位,签订《委托代建合同》,监督代建项目实施。

第四十条 县(市、区)政府投资建设项目实行代建制管理,应参照本办法执行。

  第四十一条 本规定自发布之日起实施。


民政部办公厅关于严禁购买使用伪造的婚姻证件的通知

民政部


民政部办公厅关于严禁购买使用伪造的婚姻证件的通知
民政部


各省、自治区、直辖市民政厅(局),各计划单列市民政局:
最近,在广东、新疆、河北、青海、山东、安徽、浙江等地相继发现浙江省苍南县湖里三八塑印厂、浙江省苍南县长城实业公司等厂家打着“经民政部认可”、“民政部有关专家审定”的旗号,推销假婚姻证件。为了防止各地订购和发放这类婚姻证件,维护婚姻证件的严肃性和婚姻当
事人的合法权益,特作如下通知:
1.各地民政部门要严格按照民政部《关于使用新式婚姻证件有关问题的通知》(民婚函[1992]317号)的规定做好换证工作。
2.婚姻证件的印制和发放工作由省级民政厅(局)统一管理。严禁伪造、购买和使用假婚姻证件。已经购买假婚姻证件的,禁止发放;已经发放的必须追回更换,不得让假婚姻证件存留在婚姻当事人手中,切实维护法律证件的严肃性和婚姻当事人的合法权益。
3.凡遇推销假婚姻证件的,要坚决予以制止,并尽快查明情况,上报民政部婚姻管理司,以便及时处理。
4.各地在印制结婚证时,应在发证机关处套印本省(自治区、直辖市)民政厅(局)婚姻登记机关专用章。各地在石家庄548印钞厂领取的结婚证内芯,必须严格管理,不得转卖。



1993年5月4日